Mathematicians are one over on the physicists in that they already have a unified theory of mathematics, namely set theory. Unfortunately the plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians. Will man's knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZF C? This author does not think so, and in fact he feels there is a schema concerning non-constructible sets which is a very natural candidate for being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. To understand the motivation why, let us take a very short look back at the history of the development of mathematics. Mathematics began with the study of mathematical objects very physical and concrete in nature and has progressed to the study of things completely imaginary and abstract. Most mathematicians now accept these objects as as mathematically legitimate as any of their more concrete counterparts. It is enough that these objects are consistently imaginable, i.e., exist in the world of set theory. Applying the same intuition to set theory itself, we should accept as sets as many that we can whose existence are consistent with ZF C. Of course this is only a vague notion, but knowledge of set theory so far, namely of the existence of L provides a good starting point. What sets can we consistently imagine beyond L? Since by forcing one can prove the consistency of ZF C with the existence of nonconstructible sets and as L is absolute, with these forcing extensions of L you have consistently imagined more sets in a way which satisfies the vague notion mentioned above. The problem is which forcing extensions should * Would like to thank Ehud Hrushovski for supporting him with funds from NSF Grant DMS 8959511 1
Mathematicians are one over on the physicists in that they already have a unified theory of mathematics, namely set theory. Unfortunately the plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians. Will man's knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZF C? This author does not think so, and in fact he feels there is a schema concerning non-constructible sets which is a very natural candidate for being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. To understand the motivation why, let us take a very short look back at the history of the development of mathematics. Mathematics began with the study of mathematical objects very physical and concrete in nature and has progressed to the study of things completely imaginary and abstract. Most mathematicians now accept these objects as as mathematically legitimate as any of their more concrete counterparts. It is enough that these objects are consistently imaginable, i.e., exist in the world of set theory. Applying the same intuition to set theory itself, we should accept as sets as many that we can whose existence are consistent with ZF C. Of course this is only a vague notion, but knowledge of set theory so far, namely of the existence of L provides a good starting point. What sets can we consistently imagine beyond L? Since by forcing one can prove the consistency of ZF C with the existence of nonconstructible sets and as L is absolute, with these forcing extensions of L you have consistently imagined more sets in a way which satisfies the vague notion mentioned above. The problem is which forcing extensions should you consider as part of the universe? But there is no problem, because if you prove the consistency of the existence of some L generic subset of a partially ordered set P ∈ L with ZF C, then P must be describable and we can easily prove the consistency of ZF C with the existence of L generic subsets of P for every P definible in L. Namely, the axiom schema IF S L (For internal forcing schema over L) defined below is consistent with ZF C.
Definition 0.1 IF S L is the axiom schema which says for every formula φ(x), if L |= there is a unique partial order P such that φ(P ), then there is a L generic subset of P in the universe V.
IF S L is a natural closure condition on a universe of set theory. Given a class model of ZF C which has no inner class model of the form L[G] for some partial order P definable in L, we can (by forcing) consistently imagine expanding the model to include such a class. Conversely, no class model of ZF C + IF S L can be contained in a class model of ZF C which does not satisfy IF S L .
Theorem 0.2 If there is a sequence M n | n < ω of transitive models with M n |= ZF C n where
proof By the compactness theorem and forcing. proof Certainly if every set definable in L is countable, then every partially ordered set definable in L is countable, so therefore is the set of dense subsets of P in L countable and so P has generic subsets over L in the universe. In the other direction, if s is a set definable in L, then so is the partially ordered set consisting of maps from distinct finite subsets of s to distinct finite subsets of ω, so a L generic subset over the partial ordering is a witness to |s| = ω. Definition 0.4 A subset r of ω is said to be absolutely definable if for some Π 1 formula θ(x),
is the axiom schema of set theory which says if r is an absolutely definable real then all definable elements of L[r] are countable (equivalently, every partial order
The following theorem is a formal justification of IF S Ab L [r] .
Theorem 0.6 Suppose V is a countable transitive model of ZF C and let {θ i (x) | i < ω} be the list of all formulas defining absolute reals such that V |= i<ω ∃ xθ i (x). Suppose that the supremum of the ordinals definable in V is in V. Then there is a countable transitive extension V ′ of V with the same ordinals such that
proof Let α * be the sup of all the ordinals definable in L. Let P be the set of finite partial one to one functions from α * to ω.
where G is a V generic subset of P. To finish the proof it is enough to prove the following claim.
proof Since P is separative, if p ∈ P and π is an automorphism of P, then for every formula ϕ(v 1 , . . . , v n ) and names
If for no p ∈ P does p ||ϕ(ň)|| then ||ϕ(ň)|| = 0. So let p ∈ P such that p ||ϕ(ň)||. By * if π is an automorphism of P then πp ||ϕ(ň)||. Let π be a permutation of ω. π induces a permutation of P by letting for p ∈ P, dom πp = dom p and letting πp(α) = π(p(α)). By letting π vary over the permutations of ω it follows that ||ϕ(ň)|| = 1. Letṙ be the name with domain {ň | n < ω} and such thaṫ r(ň) = ||ϕ(ň)|| i G (ṙ) = r, but then r = {n | ||ϕ(ň)|| = 1} which means it is in M. Since classes of the form L[r] are absolute if r is an absolutely definable real, they provide reference points from which to measure the size of the universe. We can extend the schema IF S Ab L [r] by exploiting the similarity between a class such as L(R) and a class of the form L[r] where r is an absolutely definable real. We can argue that if P is a partial order definable in L(R), and if a V generic subset of P cannot add any reals to V, then an L(R) generic subset of P should exist in V. L(R) is concrete in the sense the interpretation of L(R) is absolute in any class model containing R , and thereby like classes of the form L[r] where r is an absolutely definable real, L(R) provides a reference point from which to measure the size of the universe. This leads to the following natural strengthening of
Definition 0.8 x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable of the form V α if for some formula ψ(v) which provably defines an ordinal and which is provably ∆ 1 from ZF,
and let ZF θ be a finite part of ZF which proves ψ(v) is ∆ 1 and proves ψ(v) defines an ordinal. θ(x) is said to define a weakly absolutely definable set of the form V α . ( ρ(x) denotes the foundation rank.) Definition 0.9 IF S WAb L(Vα) is the axiom schema of set theory which says for every weakly absolutely definable set of the form V α for every partial order P definable in L(V α ), if
Theorem 0.10 If there is a sequence M n | n < ω of transitive models with M n |= ZF C n where ZF C = n∈ω ZF C n then Con(ZF C+IF S WAb L(Vα) ) proof Let θ i | i < n be a list of formulas defining weakly absolute sets of the form V α . Let {ϕ ij (x) | i < n, j < m, } be a set of formulas. It is enough to show the consistency with ZF C of i<n,j<m
Let M be a countable transitive model of enough of ZF C (including ∧ i<n ZF θ i .) Let α 0 , . . . , α n−1 be the increasing sequence of ordinals such
for i < n. We define by induction on (i, j) ∈ n × m sets G ij . Suppose
) by ϕ ij (x) and there exists a M [{G h,l |h ≤ i, l < j}] generic subset of P ij not increasing
N has the property that if P ij is a partial order definable in L(V α i ) by ϕ ij (x) and G is an N generic subset of P ij such that
Theorem 0.11 If M n | n < ω is a sequence of transitive models with M n |= ZF C n where ZF C = Corollary 0.13 IF S WAb L(Vα) is equivalent to the axiom schema of set theory which says for every weakly absolutely definable set of the form V α ,
for each κ such that for some β < α, κ ≤ |V β |, then there exists an L(V α ) generic subset G of P.
Theorem 0.14 ZF C + IF S WAb L(Vα) ⊢ CH proof Let P = the set of bijections from countable ordinals into R. Since
, and P is a definable element of L(R), there is an L(R) generic subset of P in V. If α is an ordinal less than ω 1 and r is a real, let D α = {p ∈ P | α ∈ dom p} and D r = {p ∈ P | r ∈ ran p}. For each α < ω 1 , G ∩ D α = ∅ and for each r ∈ R, G ∩ D r = ∅, so G is a bijection from ω 1 to R.
Perhaps the following is a better illustration of the kind of result obtainable from ZF C + IF S WAb L(Vα) .
Definition 0.15 A Ramsey ultrafilter on ω is an Ultrafilter on ω such that every coloring of ω with two colors has a homogenous set in the ultrafilter.
Theorem 0.16 ZF C + IF S WAb L(Vα) ⊢ there is a Ramsey ultrafilter on ω.
proof Let P be the partial order (P (ω), ⊆ * ) where P (ω) is the power set of ω and a ⊆ * b means a is a subset of b except for finitely many elements. P is definable is L(R) and is ω closed. The generic object is an Ramsey ultrafilter over L(R), and since all colorings of ω are in L(R), it is a Ramsey ultrafilter over V.
One can argue that IF S WAb L(Vα) is not a natural axiom since among the definable sets X with the property that L(X) is absolute when not increasing X, why should you choose only those of the form V α ? But it is natural in the sense it is a way of forcing the universe as large as possible with respect to the existence of generics by first fixing the height of the models under consideration and then by fixing more and more of their widths. In any case we should consider the strengthenings of IF S WAb L(Vα) defined below.
Definition 0.17 x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable if for some formula ψ(x) which is provably ∆ 1 from ZF, V |= ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ψ(y)) Definition 0.18 IF S is the axiom schema of set theory which says for every weakly absolutely definable set X, for every partial order P definable in L(X), if
then there exists an L(X) generic subset G of P.
If X is an weakly absolutely definable set and P is a partial ordering definable in L(X) such that
and if there is no L(X) generic subset of P in V, we say that V has a gap. IF S says there are no gaps. The intuition that such gaps should not occur in V leads to the following:
If ZF C + IF S is consistent, then this means that it is consistent that the universe is complete with respect to the natural yardstick classes, (the classes of the form L(X) where X is weakly absolutely definable.) In my view, confirming the consistency of ZF C + IF S would be strong evidence that the universe of set theory conforms to the axioms of IF S. One reason for this opinion is that there is no apriori reason for the consistency of ZF C + IF S, so if ZF C + IF S is consistent, it seems that confirmimg its consistency would involve some deep mathematics implying IF S should be taken seriously.
1 Formalizing the arguments in favor of IF S L and the other schemata
In this section we try to formalize the vague notion that IF S L is a natural closure condition on the universe, and that gaps in general are esthetically undesirable. For simplicity we concentrate on IF S L .
Definition 1.1 Let T be a recursive theory in the language of set theory extending ZF C. Let P be a unary predicate. If ϕ is a formula of set theory then ϕ * is ϕ with all its quantifiers restricted to P, i.e., if ∃x occurs in ϕ then it is replaced by ∃x(P (x) ∧ . . .) and ∀x is replaced by ∀x(P (x) → . . .). The theory majorizing T, T ′ , is the recursive theory in the language {ε, P (x)} such that
) is a formula defining a weakly absolutely definable set then the theory majorizing T with respect to θ(x) is T ′ plus all the axioms of the form
where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ ZF and ψ 0 (y, z) and ψ 1 (y, z) are ∆ 0 formulas.
where for some recursive function F, for each n, F (n) = T n , a finite subset of T and the T n are increasing. If there is a sequence M n | n < ω of countable transitive models such that
is the theory majorizing T ) is consistent and there is a sequence N n | n ∈ ω of countable transitive models such that
where T ′ = n∈ω T ′ n and for some recursive function H, for each n ∈ ω,
finite. We can find a subsequence N n | n ∈ ω of the M n | n ∈ ω and N n -generic sets G n such that
] * be the model in the language {ε, P (x)} obtained by letting the interpretation of P (x) to be N n . Let D be an ultrafilter on ω. Then
is a formula of set theory and if for each natural number n,
Theorem 1.4 Let T be a recursive extension of ZF C and suppose it has a consistent, complete and ω−complete extension T * .
proof By reflection in T * , by its ω−completeness and by the axiom of choice in T * , T * ⊢ ∃ N n | n ∈ ω with the N n | n ∈ ω having the same properties as in the previous theorem. As in the previous theorem since ZF C ⊂ T, T * ⊢ Con(T ′ + IF S L ). Since T * is ω−complete, (by the omitting types theorem) it has an model M with the standard set of integers. Since M |= T * ,
and as Con(T ′ +IF S L ) is an arithmetical statement, it must really be true.
Certainly if the hypothesis of the theorem fails, then T cannot be a suitable axiom system for set theory.
is a formula defining an weakly absolutely definable set, then IF S ↾ θ(x) is IF S restricted to the set defined by θ(x), i.e., it says for all partial orders P definable in L(X) were X is defined by θ(x) such that
there is an L(X) generic subset of P. Theorem 1.6 Let θ(x) be a formula defining an weakly absolutely definable set. Let T be a recursive extension of ZF C and suppose it has a consistent, complete and ω−complete extension
proof Same as above. Theorem 1.7 Let θ(x) be a formula defining an weakly absolutely definable set. Let T be a recursive extension of ZF C + IF S ↾ θ(x) and suppose
proof Working in T ′ the generics in the inner model are still generic over L(X) since the inner model is a transitive class containing all the ordinals.
The theorems in this section are meant as the formalization of the notion that we can 'consistently imagine' a class model of ZF C not satisfying IF S L as being contained in a larger class satisfying ZF C + IF S L , and that models of ZF C not satisfying IF S have a gap.
Conclusion
These axiom schemata lead to many questions, among them 3. What are the consequences for ordinary mathematics of these axioms?
The conventional view of the history of set theory says that Godel in 1938 proved that the consistency of ZF implies the consistency of ZF C and of ZF C + GCH, and that Cohen with the invention of forcing proved that Con(ZF ) implies Con(ZF + ¬AC) and Con(ZF C + ¬GCH) but from the point of view of IF S L a better way to state the history would be to say that Godel discovered L and Cohen proved there are many generic sets over L. I think confirming the consistency of IF S with ZF C would be a vindication of the idea that generics over partial orders definable in L(X) with X an weakly absolutely definable set exist, and thereby put a crack in the armor surrounding the continuim hypothesis as ZF C + IF S ↾ R ⊢ CH. On the other hand, if ZF C + IF S is not consistent, it would show the universe must have some gaps, i.e., incomplete with respect to some concrete set, an esthetically unpleasing result. It is ironic that although mathematics and especially mathematical logic is an art noted for its precise and formalized reasoning, it seems that in order to solve problems at the frontiers of logic's foundations we must tackle questions of an esthetic nature.
